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LOW COST NTRU IMPLEMENTATIONS
SUMMARY
Radio Frequency Identiﬁcation (RFID) tags and Sensor Nodes are emerging
security platforms which are gaining popularity. RFIDs are already being used
in supply chains, passports and it is envisioned that in the future they will
be used in many new applications. Wireless Sensor Networks (WSN) can be
used to monitor wildlife, the physical condition of bridges, airplane wings etc.
Thus, the security of the information transferred by these devices is essential.
To maintain this security, it is inevitable to use cryptographic algorithms in
RFID and WSN systems. This work presents a compact and low power NTRU
design that is suitable for pervasive security applications such as RFIDs and
sensor nodes. NTRU is a public-key cryptosystem based on the shortest vector
problem in lattices. Two diﬀerent architectures have been designed for NTRU.
One is only capable of encryption and the other one performs both encryption
and decryption. To reduce the static power consumption, a low leakage library
has been used. Furthermore, in order to reduce the dynamic power consumption,
clock gating, operand isolation and precomputation methods are used wherever
possible. This work is also the ﬁrst one to present a complete NTRU design with
encryption/decryption circuitry. Encryption-only NTRU design has a gate count
of 2.8 kgates, dynamic power consumption of 1.72 µW and a latency of 56.44 ms at
500 kHz. Encryption-decryption NTRU design has a gate count of 10.5 kgates,
6 µW dynamic power consumption and a latency of 56.78 ms for encryption,
119.23 ms for decryption at 500 kHz. Moreover, to evaluate the resistance of the
implementations against side channel attacks, Diﬀerential Power Analysis (DPA)
attacks were conducted on the protected and unprotected implementations of the
encryption-decryption NTRU design. The secret key in the implementations was
inferred successfully with DPA attacks.
xv
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DÜS¸ÜK TÜKETI˙MLI˙ NTRU GERÇEKLEMELERI˙
ÖZET
Radyo Frekans ile Tanmlama (RFID) etiketleri ve Alglayclar, günümüzde
popülarite kazanan ve güvenlik ihtiyaçlar artan sistemlerdir. RFID etiketleri
³imdiden tedarik zincirlerinde, pasaportlarda kullanlmaktadr ve ilerde ba³ka
alanlarda da kullanlmas öngörülmektedir. Kablosuz Alglayc A§lar (WSN)
vah³i ya³am ya da bir köprünün, bir uça§n kanatlarnn, vb. ﬁziksel durumunu
gözlemlemede kullanlabilir. Dolaysyla, bu cihazlarca aktarlan bilgilerin
güvenli§inin sa§lanmas son derece önemlidir. Gerekli olan bu güvenli§i
sa§lamann yolu da ³ifreleme algoritmalar kullanmaktan geçmektedir. Bu
çal³mada, RFID etiketleri ve alglayc a§lar gibi sistemler için uygun
olabilecek, az yer kaplayan ve dü³ük güç tüketimli NTRU gerçeklemeleri
sunulmaktadr. NTRU, güvenli§i kafeslerde en ksa vektör problemine dayanan,
açk anahtarl bir ³ifreleme algoritmasdr. NTRU için biri sadece ³ifreleme,
di§eri ise hem ³ifreleme hem ³ifre çözme i³lemlerini yapabilen iki farkl devre
tasarlanm³tr. Devrelerin statik güç harcamasn dü³ük tutmak için dü³ük kaçak
akml teknoloji kütüphaneleri kullanlm³tr. Dinamik güç harcamasn azaltmak
için ise saat i³aretini engelleme, giri³ izolasyonu ve önhesaplama yöntemlerinden
faydalanlm³tr. Bu çal³ma ayn zamanda, ³ifreleme/³ifre çözme devrelerini bir
arada bulunduran ilk NTRU tasarmdr. Sadece ³ifreleme yapan NTRU devresi,
2.8 k kaplk bir alan kaplam³ olup, 1.72 µW 'lk dinamik güç harcamas vardr
ve ³ifreleme i³lemini f = 500 kHz için 56.44 ms'de bitirmektedir. ifreleme/³ifre
çözme yapan NTRU devresi ise 10.5 k kaplk bir alan kaplamaktadr ve 6
µW 'lk dinamik güç tüketimine sahiptir. F = 500 kHz için ³ifreleme 56.78 ms'de,
³ifre çözme ise 119.23 ms'de tamamlanmaktadr. Ayrca, gerçeklemenin yan
kanal analizlerine kar³ olan dayankll§n ölçmek için, korumal ve korumasz
olarak gerçeklenmi³ ³ifreleme/³ifre çözme devresine farksal güç analizi (DPA)
yöntemiyle saldrlm³ ve sistemin gizli anahtar elde edilmi³tir.
xvii
xviii
1. INTRODUCTION
In communication systems, security of the transferred data has an essential
importance, since the data mostly contains secret information. In order to
maintain this security, cryptographic algorithms are widely used in software
and hardware implementations. Radio Frequency Identiﬁcation (RFID) tags
and Wireless Sensor Networks (WSN) are new applications which have gained
popularity as a result of their advantages in several ﬁelds.
RFID tags are wireless electronic devices which permit automated identiﬁcation
of objects and people [1]. RFID systems consist of three main components:
transponder or RFID tag, transceiver or reader and database [2]. Each RFID tag
has a microchip with some computation and storage capabilities and an antenna
for communication. RFID tags can be passive, semi-passive and active depending
on their power sources. RFID readers are devices that can interrogate the tags
via RF communication. They also supply power for the passive tags through the
RF signals. The information stored in the tags is mostly an index to a database
which is reasonable when the restricted sources of the tags are considered.
RFIDs have a wide range of application ﬁelds. They can be used to improve
the supply chain eﬃciency, to prevent the counterfeiting of medical drugs, to
identify animals and objects, to store information for the health care services
etc. [3]. Furthermore, RFID tags have already started to be used in toll payment
systems, in libraries and in passports [1].
A sensor network node's hardware contains a microchip which is capable of
some computing and storing, sensors, transceiver and a energy source [4]. They
are able to sense the changes in moisture, temperature, vibration etc. around
their environments. They are used to monitor the space, the things and the
interaction of things with each other and their surroundings. WSNs can be used
for environmental monitoring where humans can not make direct observations.
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For example researchers use WSNs to monitor nesting seabird habitats. It is
also possible to monitor the motion in physical structures like buildings, bridges,
airplane wings and to obtain information about their conditions [4]. Then, this
information can be used for maintenance and warning purposes.
In RFID and WSN systems, there are some informations which must be kept in
secret, i.e. the personal informations in RFID tags. For example, the information
regarding the condition of a bridge. Integrity and privacy of these informations
must ensured against adversaries. This can be accomplished by the usage of
cryptographic algorithms in these systems. However, implementing cryptographic
algorithms in RFID tags and WSN is a challenging issue due to the restricted
power and area resources. In RFID tags only 250-3000 gates can be allocated
for cryptographic functions [2] and only about 20 µW power is available for the
digital part of the passive tags [5]. In WSN systems, small batteries can supply
up to 100 mW that is still not more than the necessity [5]. Thus, in order to
ensure the security of the information in RFID and WSN systems, cryptographic
algorithms must be implemented in a fashion to consume low power and low area.
The feasibility of Public-key (PK) solutions for RFIDs and WSNs is an open
research problem due to severe limitations in costs, area and power. However,
PKC protocols are useful for applications that need strong cryptography and
services such as authentication, signatures, key-exchange etc. In addition, the
use of PKC reduces power due to less protocol overhead [6].
1.1 Organization of the Thesis
In this dissertation, low cost implementations of the public-key algorithm NTRU
[7] have been proposed which are viable for RFID and WSN systems. Chapter
2 gives brief information about the cryptosystems and explains the NTRU
algorithm. The power dissipation sources in CMOS circuits and the low power
design techniques among which some are used in the designs, are summarized in
Chapter 3. Chapter 4 gives the implementation details of the encryption-only
and encryption-decryption NTRU designs. Chapter 5 states the power, area
and latency results of the designs and compares them with the previous works.
2
Chapter 6 explores the security of the designs against Diﬀerential Power Analysis
(DPA) attacks. Finally, Chapter 7 concludes the thesis.
3
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2. CRYPTOSYSTEMS AND NTRU ALGORITHM
Cryptography has been used for centuries in order to communicate securely,
over unsecure channels. Especially nowadays, cryptography has the utmost
importance to ensure the security of the digital data that is transferred, since
people commonly send or receive private information over unsecure channels like
Internet. There are two classes of cryptosystems that are used to maintain the
data security: Symmetric-key and public-key cryptosystems.
2.1 Symmetric-key Cryptosystems
In symmetric-key systems both sides (sender and receiver) must share the same
secret key K, which enables them to encrypt a message with the rule eK and
to decrypt a message with the rule dK . In these systems eK and dK are same
or slightly diﬀerent [8, 9]. Figure 2.1 illustrates a symmetric-key cryptosystem.
Figure 2.1: A symmetric-key cryptosystem
Here, Alice sends the message m to Bob by encrypting it with the key K. Thus,
Oscar can see only the ciphertext which is meaningless to him. However, Bob
who has the same key K will be able to decrypt the ciphertext and obtain the
message m.
Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) [10] and Data Encryption Standard
(DES) [11] are among the well known symmetric-key cryptosystems. A major
5
drawback of the symmetric-key systems is the problem of secret key sharing
and management. The key must be distributed through a secure channel before
communication, which is practically not so easy.
2.2 Public-key Cryptosystems
The idea of the public-key cryptosystems was ﬁrst presented by Diﬃe and
Hellman [12]. In these systems there exist a public key and a private (secret)
key. The one who wants to send a message m uses the public key of the
receiver to encrypt the message with the rule epk. Then, only the receiver
who owns the secret key can decrypt the ciphertext with the rule dsk. In
public key cryptosystems, to derive the secret key from the public key must be
computationally infeasible. Figure 2.2 shows a public-key cryptosystem.
Figure 2.2: A public-key cryptosystem
When Alice wants to send a message to Bob, she encrypts the plaintext with
Bob's public key pkB and sends the ciphertext. Then, only Bob can decrypt the
ciphertext with his secret key skB. The most popular public-key cryptosystems
are RSA [13] and Elliptic Curve Cryptosystem (ECC) [14]. Since the encryption
key is open in public-key cryptosystems, there is no need to deliver keys through
a secure channel. Furthermore, public-key systems are also used in digital
signature schemes [8, 9].
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2.3 NTRU Algorithm
NTRU [7] is a public-key cryptosystem based on the shortest vector problem in
a lattice. Basic operations of NTRU are realized in a truncated polynomial ring
R= Z[X ]/(XN−1). Polynomials in the ring have integer coeﬃcients and a degree
of N−1. Addition in the truncated polynomial ring is carried out in a usual way
simply by adding the coeﬃcients that have the same degree [15].
a+b= (a0+b0)+(a1+b1)X+ . . .+(aN−1+bN−1)XN−1 (2.1)
However, multiplication is carried out in a slightly diﬀerent way than the usual
polynomial multiplication. During multiplication the rule XN ≡ 1 is applied to
all elements which have a degree equal or greater than N. This multiplication is
called star multiplication [16] and denoted with the ∗ symbol. Thus, the product
of two polynomials a and b
a(X) = a0+a1X+a2X2+ . . .+aN−1XN−1 (2.2)
b(X) = b0+b1X+b2X2+ . . .+bN−1XN−1 (2.3)
can be calculated as,
c(X) = a(X)∗b(X) (2.4)
ck = a0bk+a1bk−1+ · · ·+aN−1bk+1 = ∑
i+ j≡kmodN
aib j (2.5)
In other notation if we think the polynomials a, b and c as coeﬃcient vectors,
then, the product c = a ∗ b simply equals to convolution product of two vectors
as shown in Figure 2.3. There is no carry propagation between the columns.
a4 a3 a2 a1 a0
× b4 b3 b2 b1 b0
a4b0 a3b0 a2b0 a1b0 a0b0
a3b1 a2b1 a1b1 a0b1 a4b1
a2b2 a1b2 a0b2 a4b2 a3b2
a1b3 a0b3 a4b3 a3b3 a2b3
+ a0b4 a4b4 a3b4 a2b4 a1b4
c4 c3 c2 c1 c0
Figure 2.3: Convolution product of two vectors
NTRU public-key cryptosystem has three integer parameters (N,q, p) and four
sets L f ,Lg,Lr,Lm of polynomials of degree N−1 which have all integer coeﬃcients.
It is assumed that N is prime, gcd(p,q) = 1 and q is always fairly larger than p.
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Security level of NTRU depends on the selection of these parameter sets [7].
Table 2.1 shows the security levels of NTRU according to the chosen parameter
sets. Furthermore, NTRU with the parameter sets (N,q, p) = (251,128,3) and
Table 2.1: NTRU security levels
N q p
Moderate Security 107 64 3
High Security 167 128 3
Higest Security 503 256 3
(N,q, p) = (503,256,3), respectively has an equivalent level of security with
1024-bit RSA, 163-bit ECC and 4096-bit RSA, 320-bit ECC [16,17].
2.3.1 Key generation
To generate key sets of NTRU, one must ﬁrst choose two random small
polynomials f ∈ L f and g ∈ Lg. In this context small polynomial refers to a
polynomial whose coeﬃcients are much smaller than q. The polynomials f and
g must be kept in private to prevent others obtain the private keys. In the next
step, the inverse of polynomial f must be computed in modulo q and modulo p.
So, fq ≡ f−1 (mod q) and fp ≡ f−1 (mod p) must exist, otherwise another f must
be selected for the key generation process. As the last step, h is calculated:
h≡ fq ∗g (mod q) (2.6)
Now, the private keys of the system are f and fp and the public key of the
system is h. For more information about parameter selection, small polynomials
and ﬁnding inverses of polynomials can be found in [7, 18, 19].
2.3.2 Encryption
Firstly, a message m must be chosen from the set of plain texts Lm. m must be
a small polynomial whose coeﬃcients practically lie between d−p/2e and bp/2c.
Then, a random small polynomial r must be selected from the set Lr, to use as
blinding value. Finally, encrypted text can be evaluated as follows:
e≡ pr ∗h+m (mod q) (2.7)
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In the encryption process, h is always multiplied with p. Since these values do
not change for the following encryptions, it is suggested to use the public key
h≡ p fq ∗g (mod q) instead of h≡ fq ∗g (mod q) [15].
2.3.3 Decryption
In order to decrypt a received message e, one must ﬁrst compute
a= f ∗ e (mod q) (2.8a)
= f ∗ (r ∗h+m) (mod q) (2.8b)
= f ∗ (r ∗ p fq ∗g+m) (mod q) (2.8c)
= pr ∗g+ f ∗m (mod q) (2.8d)
At this stage it is essential to chose the coeﬃcients of a between −q/2 and q/2
instead of 0 and q−1. Otherwise, message may not be properly recovered. After
this step,
b= a (mod p) (2.9a)
= f ∗m (2.9b)
should be calculated. And, as the ﬁnal step, plaintext is recovered with the
following calculations:
c= b∗ fp (mod p) (2.10a)
= fp ∗ f ∗m (mod p) (2.10b)
= m (2.10c)
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3. LOW POWER DESIGN TECHNIQUES
The main concern in designs which have restricted resources, is to reduce the
power dissipation, as much as possible. There exists many methods in the
literature which are devoted to this subject. These power reduction methods
can be classiﬁed into two, as technological level methods and architectural level
methods. These methods are brieﬂy mentioned in this section. The details of
these methods can be found in [2023].
3.1 Sources of Power Dissipation
In CMOS digital circuitry there are two kinds of power dissipation [20]: Dynamic
and static. For clarity, the causes of dynamic and static power dissipation is
explained on a CMOS inverter.
3.1.1 Dynamic power dissipation
Dynamic power is the power consumed by a gate when that gate is active which
means there is a switching activity in the logic levels of the gate. The major source
of the dynamic power dissipation is the switching power which is consumed to
charge and discharge the output capacitance of the gate [22].
Figure 3.1: Dynamic power dissipation
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In case of a '1'→'0' transition at the input of the inverter, the capacitance will
be charged by the pMOS transistor and for a '0'→'1' transition, the capacitance
will be discharged by the nMOS transistor. Cload is the total capacitance from
transistors and interconnect wires and VDD is the supply voltage. The energy for
one transition is:
Energy/transitions =Cload×V 2DD (3.1)
Then, switching power can be formulated as:
Pdyn = Energy/transitions× f =Cload×V 2DD×Ptrans× fclk (3.2)
f is the frequency of transitions, Ptrans is the probability of an transition and fclk
is the system clock. If we put Ce f f = Ptrans×Cload, then it is also possible to
express the dynamic power as:
Pdyn =Ce f f ×V 2DD× fclk (3.3)
As it can be seen dynamic power does not depend on transistor parameters,
but depends on the switching activity and load capacitances. Hence, it is data
dependent.
Another source of dynamic power consumption is the internal power. During the
transition of the gate there happens a time that both transistors are on. At that
period a short circuit current ﬂows from VDD to ground and causes a internal
power dissipation. But with careful design of the circuits internal power can be
kept below the 10-15 % of the total power consumption [21]. This component
can be expressed in the dynamic power equation as follows:
Pdyn = (Ce f f ×V 2DD× fclk)+(tsc×VDD× Ipeak× fclk) (3.4)
Where tsc is the duration of the short circuit current and Ipeak is the total internal
current (short circuit current plus the current needed to charge the internal
capacitance).
3.1.2 Static power dissipation
Static power is the power dissipated by a gate when that gate is inactive. The two
main source of the static power dissipation in CMOS circuits are subthreshold
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Figure 3.2: Static power dissipation
leakage currents and gate leakage currents [21, 22]. Subthreshold leakage is the
current that ﬂows from the drain to the source due to reduced threshold voltages
that prevent the gate from completely turning oﬀ. Gate leakage is the current
which ﬂows from the gate through the oxide to the substrate. It is possible to
formulate the static power as in the Equation 3.5.
Psta = IleakTot ×VDD (3.5)
Leakage currents are increasing, as the CMOS technology improves, due to low
threshold voltages. It is known that in the future, static power dissipation will
play a major role like the dynamic power dissipation [20,22].
3.2 Technological Level Power Reduction Methods
Some well known technological level power optimization methods are explained
under this section, although the only method applied in this work is the usage of
a low leakage technology library. However these methods can be used in order to
obtain better results.
3.2.1 Multi VDD
Lowering the supply voltage VDD decreases the dynamic power, since the power
dissipation is proportional to V2DD. But it also decreases the speed of the gates.
Thus, the idea is to use diﬀerent supply voltages for the diﬀerent modules of the
system, still with meeting the system timing constraints. In Figure 3.3 a multi
VDD system is illustrated. CPU and Cache RAMs are supplied with high voltage
to meet the system timing while the rest of the chip is supplied with low voltage.
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Figure 3.3: Multi VDD system
Hence, each component of the system is working in the lowest possible voltage
with meeting the timing requirements, to save power.
3.2.2 Multi-threshold logic
Technology libraries can contain more than one version of the same cell with
diﬀerent threshold voltages. By the help of the implementation tools this property
can be used to reduce the static power dissipation. The method is to use fast,
low VT and leaky transistors only on the critical timing paths to meet the timing
and for the rest of the design to use slower, high VT and less leaky transistors.
3.2.3 Power gating
In this method the aim is temporarily to turn oﬀ the blocks that are not being
used and reducing the static power dissipation. One way to realize this idea is
using an externally switched power supply. A unit that has an oﬀ-chip power
supply can be turned oﬀ by shutting down its power supply and the leakage in
that unit can be reduced to zero. However, this method takes the longest time
and requires the most energy to restore power to a gated block.
Another approach for power gating is to use internal switches to disconnect the
gates from VDD and/or ground. In practical, disconnecting the gate from one of
VDD or ground is enough. These power switches can be implemented in each cell
separately. But, a more area eﬃcient method of implementing these switches is
to use one switch for a block of gates as shown in Figure 3.4.
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Figure 3.4: Power gated blocks
3.3 Architectural Level Power Reduction Methods
In this work, mainly architectural level optimizations, such as clock gating,
gate level optimizations, operand isolation and precomputation, provide power
reduction. These methods were used wherever possible in the designs.
3.3.1 Clock gating
Clock gating is an eﬀective method to decrease the dynamic power consumption.
The aim is to disable the clock of a component when its outputs are not used.
Thus, switching activity of the ﬂip-ﬂops, gates in the fan-out of the ﬂip-ﬂops
and the clock trees can be reduced. The most preferred clock gating circuitry
contains a latch to prevent glitches occurring. Figure 3.5 shows a register bank
implemented in a typical fashion. In this implementation, registers switch every
Figure 3.5: Typical register implementation
clock cycle even they are not selected by the enable signal. So, to prevent this
unwanted switching activity, registers can be implemented with a clock gating
circuitry as illustrated in Figure 3.6. With this implementation registers switch
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Figure 3.6: Clock gated register implementation
only when their output is selected. Note also that, clock gating saves circuit area
as a result of the removal of the many MUXs with one clock gating circuitry.
3.3.2 Gate level optimizations
The approach in this method is remapping the logic gates of the components to
obtain less power dissipating structures without changing their functions. Above
of the Figure 3.7, the output of the AND gate is remapped to make the high
activity net internal to the cell. The output of the AND gate is now driving a
smaller capacitance node. Thus, dynamic power is reduced.
Figure 3.7: Gate level optimizations
Below of the Figure 3.7, a four input AND gate is ﬁrstly mapped as, a high
activity net is connected to a high capacitance pin and a low activity net is
connected to a low capacitance pin. By swapping these inputs so that high
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activity net is connected to a low capacitance pin, dynamic power consumption
can be decreased.
3.3.3 Operand isolation
The aim of the operand isolation is to isolate the inputs of the complex
combinational logic gates such as adders and multipliers whenever their outputs
are not selected. Thus, isolation logic prevents the gates switching unnecessarily
and reduces dynamic power consumption.
Figure 3.8: Operand Isolation
As illustrated in Figure 3.8 input A is allowed to enter the complex logic only if
the output of thecomplex logic is selected.
3.3.4 Precomputation
This method is based on the fact that in many cases there are some input values
for which the output of the circuit can be computed easily. That is to say, the
input values of the system are checked and for some values output is computed
by an other circuit which is smaller than the main circuit. This allows reducing
the dynamic power in the main circuit.
Figure 3.9: A precomputed circuit architecture
In the Figure 3.9, the input values are checked by g. For some values the input
registers are disabled. So, the switching activity of f is stopped. The result
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is computed by g and given to the output through multiplexer. However, this
method also brings increase in the delay and the area of the circuit due to the
added extra logic.
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4. NTRU IMPLEMENTATION
In this work, two NTRU implementations has been proposed. One design is
only capable of encryption and the other one is capable of both encryption and
decryption. Designs were written in GEZEL [24] hardware design language. For
the designs, a parameter set (N,q, p) = (167,128,3) was used which yields to a
high level of security [7]. Moreover, during the design phase, power consumption
reduction methods, such as clock gating, precomputation and operand isolation,
were used wherever possible.
4.1 Implementation of Encryption-Only NTRU
In the encryption-only NTRU design, as a result of the selected parameter set
(N,q, p) = (167,128,3), public key h has coeﬃcients from the interval [0,127],
random polynomial r and message m have coeﬃcients from the set {−1,0,1}.
Thus, the coeﬃcients of h are encoded in 7-bits and the coeﬃcients of m and r are
encoded in 2-bits. While dealing with the negative numbers, two's complement
representation is used.
The main architecture of the encryption-only design, as shown in Figure 4.1,
consists of a look-up table (LUT), a polynomial multiplier (PM), a partially
rotating register (PRR) and a control logic. In the design, enc input is used
to detect the start signal, rin and message inputs are used to receive random
polynomial and message respectively. Output done is used to inform the ending
of the computation of a new result and result output is used to give the encrypted
text coeﬃcients.
Random polynomial generation is beyond the scope of this work, so it is assumed
that circuit has an outer source for random number generation, in order to
produce the random polynomial r.
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Figure 4.1: Encryption-only NTRU architecture
4.1.1 Look-up table
In order to reduce the computation load, public key h ≡ p fq ∗ g (mod q)
is precomputed and stored as a look-up table. The LUT consists of only
combinational circuit. It gives the 7-bit public key coeﬃcient according to the
value of its 8-bit address input.
4.1.2 Polynomial multiplier
The polynomial multiplier (PM) is the arithmetic core of the design where all
computations are carried out. It has a 7-bit multiplier, a 7-bit Carry Lookahead
Adder (CLA), and a 7-bit register as shown in Figure 4.2. All of the submodules
of the PM are realized for 7-bit computations since all operations are done modulo
128. This way, intermediate and ﬁnal results are directly reduced in modulo 128
during computations, simply by ignoring the 8th bit.
Due to the small coeﬃcients of random polynomial r, multiplier has a simple
structure. Multiplier has one 7-bit multiplicand input and one 2-bit multiplier
input. Since the coeﬃcients of r take values only from the set {−1,0,1}, the
product of a multiplicand x is easily computed from the set {−x,0,x}. In the
case of a negative multiplier, the product is generated by inverting the bits of the
multiplicand and setting the carry input of the following CLA adder to '1'.
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Figure 4.2: Polynomial multiplier
CLA adder is selected for the implementation because of its non-carry propagation
property which is needed for less switching activity [25, 26]. Also CLA adder
is implemented in two blocks which are 4-bits and 3-bits length. Intermediate
products are saved in the 7-bit register and the value of the register is always fed
back to the CLA adder input. The value of the register is updated by the sum
of the partial product and the current register value. After all multiplication and
accumulation steps, add mes input is enabled and message is added to the current
value of the register to generate the ﬁnal result. To reduce the switching activity
at the output of the PM, result output remains unchanged until ﬁnal results are
computed.
For a more clear view of the encryption multiplication, one may think h and r as
the polynomials b and a in Figure 2.3 respectively.
4.1.3 Partially rotating register
Partially rotating register (PRR) is used to store and rotate the random
polynomial r's coeﬃcients and it is N × 2 bits wide. Before encryption all
coeﬃcients of r are loaded into PRR and then encryption starts. During
encryption, the random polynomial coeﬃcient at the input of PM changes for
every public key coeﬃcient, which means, for every partial product, r's coeﬃcient
value must be updated. So in case of a regular rotating register, all of the bits
must be shifted once, which means switching activity of N×2 registers for every
partial product computation. Simulations have shown that clock gating a regular
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rotating register, does not have a positive eﬀect on the power consumption in
the case of NTRU encryption, due to the continuous rotation of the register.
On the contrary, it increases the dynamic power consumption owing to the
extra switching activity that comes from the gating circuits (See Table 5.1). To
overcome this negative situation and to beneﬁt from clock gating maximally, a
partially rotating register was designed, as illustrated in Figure 4.3.
Figure 4.3: Partially rotating register (PRR)
In this architecture the right hand side 32-bit register is the part that always
rotates during encryption and loading of the random polynomial r. The two
most signiﬁcant bits of that register are used as data input during loading phase.
Output of the PRR is always the least signiﬁcant two bits of that register. A
partial rotate signal is sent by the controller which only enables rotating of the
right hand side 32-bit register. After all 16 values of that register are used in
the computations, a whole rotate signal is generated to renew the values of the
register. This signal causes the PRR to make a block rotation with width of
32-bits. With this method, only 32 bits of the PRR switch constantly while the
rest of the registers switch only 9 times in the computation of each cipher text
word and during loading of r.
4.1.4 Control logic
Controller of the encryption engine was designed as a ﬁnite state machine (FSM)
which has four states. It controls the whole process with two 8-bit counters
and one 4-bit counter. One of the 8-bit counters is used to count the number of
intermediate products in one cipher text computation, while the other one is used
to count the number of the produced cipher text coeﬃcients. The 4-bit counter
is used to control the partial rotate and the whole rotate signals of the PRR.
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Figure 4.4: FSM of encryption-only NTRU
Figure 4.4 shows the state transition diagram of the FSM. Here Cnt1 and
Cnt2 refer to 8-bit counters. Circuit produces the encrypted text polynomial
coeﬃcients from the least signiﬁcant one to the most signiﬁcant one. The FSM
works as follows:
• Initial: It is the start state of the circuit after reset signal. In this state circuit
only checks its enc input and if detects a high signal at the input, transits to
the loading state.
• Loading: During this state, the coeﬃcients of the random polynomial r are
loaded into the PRR one by one. After loading all of the coeﬃcients (N clock
cycles), FSM passes to the multiplication state.
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• Multiplication : This is the state which the multiplication h∗ r is carried out.
The coeﬃcients of h and r are multiplied and accumulated in this state. After
ﬁnishing all the N multiplications and accumulations (N clock cycles) that is
needed for the generation of one cipher text coeﬃcient, FSM goes to the add
message state.
• Add Message: At this last state, message is added to the current sum value
and done output is made '1' for one clock cycle (1 clock cycle). Unless, it is
the last coeﬃcient, FSM transits to the multiplication state to calculate the
next cipher text coeﬃcient, otherwise it transits to the initial state.
4.2 Implementation of Encryption-Decryption NTRU
In the encryption-decryption NTRU, the same parameter set was used. Thus,
again the coeﬃcients of h and r are encoded in 7-bits and 2-bits respectively.
Also, in this case two more polynomials that are private keys f and fp was used.
f has coeﬃcients from the set {−1,0,1} and fp has coeﬃcients from the set
{0,1,2}. Hence, the coeﬃcients of f and fp are also encoded in 2-bits. Figure
4.5 illustrates the architecture of encryption-decryption NTRU. For simplicity of
the ﬁgure, not all of the modules and inner signals are shown.
There are extra modules in the design which have been added to the
encryption-only NTRU architecture. These are, two more look-up tables to store
the private keys f and fp, a Mod-3 unit, a N× 7 bits wide PRR and a result
register. Moreover, there are four routers, composed by multiplexers, which direct
the correct values to the correct inputs.
Look-up tables give the key coeﬃcient value according to their 8-bit address input.
LUT of h has a 7-bit output whereas LUT's of f and fp have 2-bit outputs.
4.2.1 Polynomial multiplier
The architecture of the PM is the same as in Figure 4.2, but some modiﬁcations
have been done to make the circuit, decryption compatible. Since, fp is now
included in multiplication, some extra circuitry was added to the multiplier so
it is capable of multiplying by 2. Multiplication by 2 is simply achieved by
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Figure 4.5: Encryption-decryption NTRU architecture
shifting the multiplicand to the left once. Reduction modulo 128 is performed by
ignoring the most signiﬁcant bit of the shifted multiplicand and inserting a '0' to
the least signiﬁcant bit of the shifted value. Table 4.1 shows the truth table of
the multiplier.
Furthermore, an overﬂow output was added to the PM, which is the carry output
of the CLA adder, to count the number of modulo 128 reductions in the second
multiplication of decryption. Since, the PM is designed to work only in modulo
128, the number of modulo 128 reductions is used to obtain the correct results,
where the multiplications must be carried out in modulo 3.
Table 4.1: Truth table of the PM multiplier
Multiplier Multiplicand Output
Bit representation Decimal value
00 0 m6m5m4m3m2m1m0 0000000
01 1 m6m5m4m3m2m1m0 m6m5m4m3m2m1m0
10 2 m6m5m4m3m2m1m0 m5m4m3m2m1m00
11 -1 m6m5m4m3m2m1m0 m′6m
′
5m
′
4m
′
3m
′
2m
′
1m
′
0
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4.2.2 Rotating registers
There are two rotating registers in the design. One is a N×7 bits PRR and the
other one is a N×2 bits regular rotating register. PRR is used to store and rotate
the incoming cipher text. Regular rotating register has two functions. Its ﬁrst
function is to store and rotate the random polynomial r during encryption and
the second one is to store and rotate the intermediate result b = a (mod p) [a =
f ∗ e (mod q)] which occurs during decryption. N × 7 bits wide PRR has the
same architecture as the one in Figure 4.3, only with modiﬁed bit lengths. It
also rotates in the same direction. However, register N×2, rotates in the reverse
direction, as shown in Figure 4.6.
Figure 4.6: Rotating register N×2
The least signiﬁcant two bits are used as inputs during loading of the register and
these two bits are also the output of the register.
4.2.3 Mod-3 unit
There are two reduction 3 operations during decryption. The First one is b =
a (mod p) and the second one is c = b∗ fp (mod p). These modulo 3 reductions
are performed by a ﬁnite state machine based circuit [27]. The state transition
diagram of the FSM is illustrated in Figure 4.7.
Figure 4.7: Mod-3 FSM
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The FSM starts with the state 0 and checks the bits of the binary number from
the most signiﬁcant bit to the least signiﬁcant bit. According to the value of the
bit that is being checked, it makes state transitions. The ﬁnal state after checking
the last bit, equals to the modulus 3 value of that number.
Furthermore, overﬂow output of the PM is connected to this module. There
is a 2-bit overﬂow counter which detects and counts the overﬂows that occurs
in the PM. The counter always starts with 0 to a new reduction and counts in
the sequence {0,2,1,0,2,1, . . .} which denotes the overﬂow sums in modulus 3 as
shown in Figure 4.8.
1st Overflow 128 ≡ 2 mod (3)
2nd Overflow 256 ≡ 1 mod (3)
3rd Overflow 384 ≡ 0 mod (3)
4th Overflow 512 ≡ 2 mod (3)
...
...
Figure 4.8: The overflow sums in modulus 3
The correct modulus 3 result of the input is calculated by concatenating the value
of the counter to the end of the input bits and checking that value by the module's
FSM. In the ﬁrst reduction by 3, results are generated from the set {0,1,2} to
decide the number of overﬂows in the following (2nd) multiplication of decryption
correctly, whereas in the second reduction 3, results are generated from the set
{−1,0,1}.
The coeﬃcients of the ﬁrst decryption multiplication a = f ∗ e (mod q) must
lie between −q/2 and q/2 before performing reduction 3. This operation is
also performed in Mod-3 unit. In order to place the coeﬃcients in the interval
[−q/2,q/2], q must be subtracted from the coeﬃcients that are bigger than q/2.
Thus, negative numbers involve in reduction by 3. But in this design, instead of
dealing with negative numbers, another way has been chosen. If x > 64, instead
of calculating (x− 128) ≡ y (mod 3), {(x ≡ a (mod 3))− (128 ≡ 2 (mod 3))} ≡
y (mod 3) is computed. The circuit ﬁrst computes the modulo 3 value of x which
is a and then gives to the output, 2 smaller of a as the result.
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4.2.4 Routers
The four routers in the architecture are, LUT input address router, PM input
router, rotating registers input router and result register input router. Under the
supervision of the control logic, these routers provide three diﬀerent connection
conﬁgurations for the architecture. These conﬁgurations are denoted as, Enc,
Dec1, Dec2.
• Enc: This is the conﬁguration needed for encryption. Under this conﬁguration,
7-bit and 2-bit inputs of the PM are bounded to LUT h and register N× 2
outputs respectively. The message input of PM is connected to data in. Input
of the register N× 2 is connected to r in and output of PM is connected to
result register input.
• Dec1: Dec1 is the conﬁguration of the ﬁrst multiplication and modulo 3
reduction during decryption process. Under Dec1, data in is connected to
the input of the PRR. 7-bit and 2-bit inputs of the PM are bounded to PRR
and LUT f outputs respectively. Output of the PM is connected to the input
of Mod-3 unit, while the output of the Mod-3 unit is connected to the input
of register N×2.
• Dec2: The third conﬁguration Dec2 belongs to the second multiplication and
modulo 3 reduction of decryption. Here, 7-bit and 2-bit inputs of the PM are
connected to LUT fp and register N×2 respectively. Output of PM is again
bounded to Mod-3 unit input but the output of the Mod-3 unit is connected
to the result register.
4.2.5 Control logic
Controller of the encryption-decryption NTRU is also designed as a ﬁnite state
machine which has seven states. It controls the encryption and decryption
processes with two 8-bit counters and one 4-bit counter. Again, similar to the
encryption-only NTRU controller, 8-bit counters are used to control the nested
multiplication loops, while 4-bit counter is used to control PRR. Figure 4.9
illustrates the state transition diagram of the design.
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Figure 4.9: FSM of encryption-decryption NTRU
Cnt1 and Cnt2 refer to the 8 bit counters. Circuit generates the cipher text
coeﬃcients from the least signiﬁcant one to the most signiﬁcant one. Also during
decryption, it receives the cipher text coeﬃcients in the same order and produces
the plain text again from the least signiﬁcant coeﬃcient to the most signiﬁcant
coeﬃcient. The FSM works as follows:
• Initial: The FSM starts with this state after reset and goes directly to the
checking state with controlling the enc and dec inputs.
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• Checking: At this state controller checks the enc and dec inputs every clock
cycle. On detection of a high signal at one of these inputs, FSM transits to
the loading state, otherwise stays at this state.
• Loading: If it is encryption, coeﬃcients of r are loaded to the register N× 2
one by one (N clock cycles), else if it is decryption, coeﬃcients of cipher text e
are loaded to the PRR one by one (N clock cycles). Loading state is followed
by the multiplication state.
• Multiplication: Multiplication state is common for encryption and decryption
since polynomial multiplication is carried out in the same way in both
situations (N clock cycles). However, the next state depends on the
computation. If it is encryption the FSM transits to the add message state,
otherwise it transits to the reduction 3 state.
• Add Message: At this state message is added to the current sum (1 clock
cycle). Add Message is followed by the ﬁnal result state.
• Reduction 3: At reduction 3 state, the result generated by PM is loaded in
Mod-3 unit and the modulo 3 value of that number is calculated. Reduction
takes n+3 clock cycles where n is the bit length of the input value. Reduction
3 state is also followed by the ﬁnal result state.
• Final Result: If the circuit is performing an encryption, controller loads the
result register (1 clock cycle) with the current result which was generated
after the add message state and makes the done output '1' for one clock
cycle. If decryption is being carried out and the circuit is performing the ﬁrst
multiplication, the FSM loads the reduction 3 result to the register N× 2 (1
clock cycle). If the second multiplication is being carried out, then reduction
by 3 result is loaded into the result register (1 clock cycle) and done output
is made '1' for one clock cycle. For all situations, if the last coeﬃcient is
given out, system transits to the initial state, otherwise it transits back to
multiplication state.
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5. RESULTS AND ANALYSIS
The NTRU designs were written in GEZEL [24] hardware design language and
optimized for low power and low area. Since the circuit is planned to be running
at low frequencies, a low leakage technology library was used for synthesis process.
As the technology library, the Faraday Low Leakage 0.13µm library was selected.
For the synthesis, the VHDL codes, which were generated automatically by
GEZEL, were used. Designs were synthesized by Synopsys Design Vision [28] at
500 kHz. RTL level and gate level simulations were done by ModelSim. All power
estimations were done by Synopsys Power Compiler [23] and these measurements
were carried out by the switching activity which was captured by the gate level
simulations in ModelSim.
5.1 Power Estimation Methodology
In order to estimate the power consumption of the designs as accurate as possible,
power simulations were done in the gate-level by using the switching activity.
Figure 5.1 shows the power estimation ﬂow.
After compiling the design with Synopsys, a verilog netlist and a standard delay
format (SDF) ﬁle are produced in order to be used in simulations. The SDF ﬁle
contains the timing information of the cells in the netlist. After this step the
netlist is simulated in ModelSim and a value change dump (VCD) ﬁle is created
by the simulator. The VCD ﬁle keeps the switching activity of the signals of
the netlist. Then, this VCD ﬁle is converted to a switching activity interchange
format (SAIF) ﬁle, which is used by the Synopsys Power Compiler. As the ﬁnal
step, Power Compiler generates the power estimation reports by using the netlist
information and SAIF ﬁle.
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Figure 5.1: Power estimation flow
5.2 Results
Three diﬀerent encryption-only NTRU designs were synthesized in order to ﬁnd
the best solution. In the ﬁrst design, no enhancements have been applied to
decrease the power consumption. In the second design, clock gating was applied
to all possible registers and in the third design, partially rotating registers were
used with clock gating. These designs will be denoted as Enc1, Enc2 and Enc3
respectively. Table 5.1 shows the area and power consumptions of these three
designs. Equivalent gate counts of the designs were found by dividing the total
area of the circuit by the area of one 2-input NAND gate. All of the area values
represent the gate equivalents.
It can be seen from the results that clock gating regular registers does not decrease
the power consumption of NTRU encryption. On the contrary the dynamic power
consumption in Enc2 has increased to 5.57 µW from 4.51 µW . This situation
is caused by the continuous switching of the registers during encryption and
the extra switching activity added by the gating circuits. On the other hand,
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Table 5.1: Power and area consumption of encryption-only NTRU
Designs
Area Power
Comb Non-comb Total Pdyn(µW ) Psta(nW ) Ptot(µW )
Enc1 680 2,537 3,217 4.51 12.6 4.52
Enc2 666 2,078 2,744 5.57 12.3 5.58
Enc3 776 2,107 2,884 1.72 13 1.74
results show that using clock gating with partially rotating registers reduces
the dynamic power consumption dramatically. Moreover, considerably low static
power consumptions were estimated as a result of the technology library which
has pW as the leakage power unit.
Table 5.2 compares the designs Enc1 and Enc3 in detail. The rotating register
in the design Enc1 is the major source of area consumption (73.6 %) and power
consumption (82.6 %). It can be seen from the results that using PRR with clock
gating, reduces the power consumption of the design by 60 %. It also decreases the
area consumption as a result of clock gating. Furthermore Enc3 design consumes
only 0.18 µW in the idle state. The best solution, Enc3 consumes an area of
Table 5.2: Comparisons of the designs Enc1 and Enc3
Designs Modules Area PowerComb Non-comb Total (%) Pdyn(µW ) Psta(nW ) Ptot(µW ) (%)
Enc1
Controller 131 111 243 7.6 0.2 1.05 0.237 5.2
Lut h 416 0 416 12.9 0.28 1.52 0.239 5.3
PM 98 87 186 5.8 0.3 0.83 0.306 6.8
N×2 Reg 31 2,338 2,369 73.6 3.72 9.17 3.74 82.6
NTRU Top 680 2,537 3,217 100 4.51 12.6 4.52 100
Enc3
Controller 145 145 290 10.1 0.31 1.3 0.315 18.1
Lut h 416 0 416 14.4 0.22 1.52 0.22 12.9
PM 100 81 181 6.3 0.25 0.84 0.26 14.8
N×2 PRR 113 1,881 1,993 69.1 0.9 9.33 0.938 54
NTRU Top 776 2,107 2,884 100 1.72 13 1.74 100
2,884 gate equivalents. In all of the designs encryption takes N × (N + 1)+N
clock cycles. N clock cycles for loading of the random polynomial and (N+ 1)
clock cycles for the generation of one cipher text coeﬃcient. For the implemented
case, N = 167 and f = 500 kHz, the latency is 28,223 clock cycles which is equal
to 56.44 ms.
In order to ﬁnd the best solution for the encryption-decryption NTRU, the same
route has been followed as the encryption-only case. Firstly, a plain version was
synthesized, secondly clock gating was used for the all possible registers, and
as the third case, PRR with clock gated registers was used. As expected, the
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best solution has emerged as the last case. The most optimized design has an
equivalent gate count of 10.5 kgates which was 12.3 kgates for the unoptimized
design. Again the major source of the area consumption is the registers which
occupy 84 % of the total area (See Table 5.3).
Table 5.3: Area consumption of encryption-decryption NTRU in GEs
Block Comb Non-comb Total (%)
Controller 231 172 403 3.8
Luts 717 0 717 6.8
PM 109 81 190 1.8
Mod-3 Unit 66 102 168 1.2
N×2 33 1877 1910 18.2
N×7 388 6473 6961 66.3
Others 104 42 146 1.4
Total 1651 8848 10500 100
Power consumption of the encryption-decryption NTRU was estimated for three
diﬀerent working states: Encryption, decryption and idle state. Table 5.4 shows
these estimations as a comparison between the plain design and the optimized
design. The major sources of the power dissipation in NTRU plain are the
Table 5.4: Power consumption of encryption-decryption NTRU
Designs States
Power
Pdyn(µW ) Psta(nW ) Ptot(µW )
NTRU Plain
Encryption 12.3 49.4 12.4
Decryption 15.9 50.5 16
Idle 10.1 49.7 10.2
NTRU Opt.
Encryption 5.93 46.6 5.98
Decryption 6.04 50.8 6.11
Idle 0.45 46.3 0.5
registers N× 2 and N× 7, which consume an average 90 % of the total power
in all three states. But, it can be seen that in the optimized NTRU, using a
N × 7 PRR and a N × 2 regular register with clock gating, reduces the power
consumption more than 50 %. Moreover, because of the technology library, low
static power consumptions were estimated also in these designs.
For the encryption-decryption NTRU design, encryption takes N×((N+1)+1)+
N clock cycles while decryption takes 2×N× (N+(n+ 3)+ 1)+N clock cycles.
The extra 1 clock cycle for encryption is needed to load the result into the result
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register. In decryption, (n+ 3) is the latency of reduction by 3 where n is the
bit-length of the input value. And in both cases N clock cycles are needed for the
loading state. For the implemented case, N = 167 and f = 500 kHz, encryption
takes 56.78 ms (28,390 clock cycles) and decryption takes 119.23 ms (59,619 clock
cycles).
5.3 Comparison
There is not much work in the literature focused on low power NTRU
implementations. In the master's thesis of O'Rourke [29], a hardware core is
designed which performs only NTRU polynomial multiplication. The design has
a minimum gate count of 1483 in the case of using only one processing unit.
But the caches to store the polynomials are not included in this gate count.
So, our design which is capable of performing the whole NTRU encryption is
superior to [29] when we consider only the gate counts. Unfortunately, no power
consumption data is available for comparison. The latency estimations have
been done with diﬀerent parameter sets of NTRU and in diﬀerent frequencies
which prevents us to make fair comparisons. Another NTRU implementation
was presented by Bailey et al. [16], and it performs only NTRU encryption. The
design takes approximately 60,000 gates in a Xilinx Virtex 1000EFG860 FPGA
which is outperformed by our design.
The most detailed low power NTRU implementation belongs to Kaps [5] but it
only performs encryption. Table 5.5 compares our Enc3 implementation and [5].
These two designs were synthesized at 500 kHz frequency and for the same NTRU
parameter set, (N,q, p) = (167,128,3). Our design and [5] have almost the same
Table 5.5: Comparison of Enc3 and [5]
Design Technology Area Power LatencyComb. Non-comb Total Pdyn(µW ) Psta(nW ) Ptot(µW ) Clock cycles
[5] 0.13µm 523 2,327 2,850 4.03 15.1e+03 19.13 29,225
Our 0.13µm 776 2,107 2,884 1.72 13 1.74 28,223
gate counts. However our design outperforms [5] in dynamic power consumption
and latency. Dynamic power consumption of [5] is more than 2 times bigger
than our design. Since, [5] has not used a low leakage technology library we can
not compare the static power consumptions. Both designs work at 500 kHz, our
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design ﬁnishes encryption in 56.44 ms while in [5] encryption takes 58.45 ms.
Thus, our design is 3.5 % faster than [5].
Apart from NTRU implementations, there also exists, a compact ECC
implementation for low power applications which was presented by Batina et
al. [32]. In this paper the best solution has a gate count of 6,718 (data memory
is not included). However there are not any power and latency estimations for
that solution, so another solution which has a gate count of 8,104 (data memory
is not included) has been chosen for comparison. That solution including the
memory elements, has 12 kgates which would be more appropriate to compare
with our encryption-decryption NTRU design that has 10.5 kgates. In [32] latency
is mentioned as 115 ms for f = 500 kHz, that is also close to the decryption latency
of our design which is 119.23 ms for f = 500 kHz. Power consumption is estimated
as lower than 30 µW in [32] while our solution has an estimation of 6 µW for
both encryption and decryption.
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6. SIDE CHANNEL ANALYSIS
Cryptographic algorithms which are ensured to be secure mathematically can still
leak information about the secret data due to the defects of their implementations.
Thus, it can still be possible to obtain the secret key of a cryptographic
system which is implemented straightforwardly. Side channel analysis takes the
advantage of implementation speciﬁc characteristics to infer the secret data. Side
channel information can be the execution time of the system, the electromagnetic
emission or power consumption of the circuit.
6.1 Power Analysis
The most popular side channel analysis for embedded systems is the power
analysis, which uses the fact that power consumption of a circuit depends on
the data which is processed. It was ﬁrst proposed by Kocher et al. [33] in 1999.
In [33] two methods are introduced which are called Simple Power Analysis (SPA)
and Diﬀerential Power Analysis (DPA). In DPA only one bit is used to infer the
secret information. After Kocher et al., Messerges et al. [34,35] proposed a method
called multiple-bit DPA which uses more than one bit to attack a circuit. In 2004,
a more powerful method which is called Correlation Power Analysis (CPA) was
suggested by Brier et al. [36].
6.1.1 Simple power analysis
Simple Power Analysis is a method that needs direct visual interpretation of the
power measurements which are taken during the execution of a circuit. SPA can
reveal the sequence of the instructions as well as the secret key [33, 37]. The
vulnerability of the circuits against SPA comes from the easily distinguishable
diﬀerence of their power consumption for diﬀerent operations. For example, an
operation which is performed according to the value of a secret key bit can reveal
information about that secret key bit [37].
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6.1.2 Differential power analysis
Diﬀerential Power Analysis attacks use several power traces (see Figure 6.1)
which are measured while the circuit is active. Then these power traces are
processed in order to reveal the secret information. In CMOS circuits 0→ 1
transitions consume more power than 1→ 0 transitions [38]. This diﬀerence
helps an adversary to ﬁnd the key.
Figure 6.1: One power trace for an AES smartcard implementation
For example, if an adversary wants to attack an AES [10] implementation
on a smartcard, he must ﬁrst choose a one bit selection function D which is
conveniently one bit of the output of a targeted sbox. Then he sends several
plain texts and measures the power consumption of the circuit. After this step,
he is ready to attack the sbox output of the implementation in the ﬁrst AES
round. He computes the value of the selection function D for the plain texts and
for each key guess. If D = 1 he puts the corresponding measurement to the set
S1, if D= 0 he puts the corresponding measurement to the set S0. Afterwards he
computes the means (pointwise) of these sets, M1 and M0. Finally, he computes
the diﬀerence of these means. For the correct key guess, a peak must appear in
the diﬀerence of means as seen in the Figure 6.2.
38
(a)
(b)
Figure 6.2: Difference of means for (a) a wrong key guess and for (b) the correct key
guess
In [33] only one bit is used for the attack and the others are ignored. In order to
improve the attack, it is proposed [34, 35] to use more than one bit to conduct
the attack. This attack is called multiple-bit DPA. With this method, the
signal-to-noise ratio of the diﬀerential traces can be increased and higher and
more distinguishable peaks can be obtained than in the classical DPA. To attack
the previous AES implementation, an adversary ﬁrst chooses a d− bit selection
function which is d bits of the output of an sbox. Then he computes the values
for the selection function as in the classical DPA. The adversary partitions the
39
power measurements into three sets. He puts the power measurements in the set
S1 if all bits of d are one, in the set S0 if all bits of d are zero, else in the set S2.
The values in the set S2 are not used. Finally he calculates the diﬀerence of the
means of the sets S1 and S0. Figure 6.3 shows the results for both methods.
(a) Classical DPA
(b) Multiple-bit DPA
Figure 6.3: DPA results for the AES implementation
Another method, which is more eﬀective than the former methods, is called
Correlation Power Analysis (CPA) [36]. It is based on ﬁnding the correlation
coeﬃcient between power measurements and the power consumption model of
the system. The number of bits switching from one state to another highly aﬀects
the power consumption in the circuit [37]. The power dissipation of the circuit
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can be modeled with the Hamming Distance Model. The Hamming distance is
the number of ﬂipping bits from a reference state R to another state D. Thus, the
number of the switching bits equals H(R⊕D) where H represents the Hamming
weight function which is simply the number of bits that are set to '1'. Using the
Hamming Distance Model and the plain text values, the power consumption of the
circuit is modeled for all the possible reference states and the key guesses. Then,
the correlation coeﬃcients between the power measurements and the predicted
power consumption values are calculated. The Pearson correlation coeﬃcient
between the power measurements and the predictions can be estimated by the
following equation [36]:
ρˆWH(R) =
N∑WiHi,R−∑Wi∑Hi,R√
N∑W 2i − (∑Wi)2
√
N∑H2i,R− (∑Hi,R)2
(6.1)
Here, H denotes the Hamming Distance Model of the circuit for the reference
state R. W represents the power traces for N measurements. The summations
are taken over N samples and the correlation coeﬃcient has to be estimated for
each time slice within the tracesWi separately. The highest correlation coeﬃcient
appears for the correct key and reference state guess. The result of the CPA for
the AES smartcard implementation is shown in Figure 6.4.
6.2 Power Analysis Attacks on NTRU
In order to test the security of the NTRU implementation, CPA attacks were
conducted on the encryption-decryption NTRU circuit. The NTRU design which
is used for DPA attacks, has only operand isolation as the power reduction
method. The ﬁrst multiplication of decryption which is a = f ∗ e (mod q)
(e = eo + e1X + . . .+ eN−1XN−1, f = f0 + f1X + . . .+ fN−1XN−1) is chosen for
the attack. The coeﬃcients of a(X) are computed serially in decreasing order,
starting from aN−1. Each coeﬃcient is computed with a multiply and accumulate
approach. In each clock cycle the architecture computes the product of two
coeﬃcients, adds it to the previously computed value which is fed back from
a register, and updates the register with the new value. The register which
stores the intermediate values is set to all zeros before starting to compute a
new coeﬃcient of a. For example, the computation of aN−1 starts with the
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(a) Wrong key and reference state
(b) Correct key and reference state
Figure 6.4: CPA results for the AES implementation
computation of the partial product e0 fN−1. Then, the ﬁrst partial product is
loaded to the register and the second partial product e1 fN−2 is computed. In the
following clock cycle the sum of the value of the register which is e0 fN−1 and the
second partial product is loaded to the register and the third partial product is
computed. The computation proceeds similarly till reaching the result aN−1.
6.2.1 Measurement setup
NTRU design was implemented on a Xilinx Virtex-II (xc2vp7-5fg456) FPGA. The
design occupies 1,167 slices which is 23 % of the total slice number. The FPGA
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was supplied with an external DC power supply (3.3V). The clock frequency of
the circuit was 100 kHz. The current was measured with a current probe which
is placed serially between the power supply and the VDD input of the FPGA. The
output of the probe was sampled with an oscilloscope with 1 GHz bandwidth at
a rate of 40 MS/s. Then, the sampled data was transferred to a PC for analysis.
In the power analysis, N = 16,384 power traces were used. Figure 6.5, shows one
of these power traces. The power trace contains six clock cycles which covers an
idle cycle and the ﬁrst ﬁve cycles of the ﬁrst multiplication of decryption.
Figure 6.5: One power trace for the NTRU implementation
The cipher text values were given by another circuit which is implemented in
the same FPGA. In order to obtain uniformly distributed inputs, e0i and e1i
were chosen as bi/128c (mod 128) and i (mod 128) respectively where i is the
measurement number. All other coeﬃcients of e were set to all zeros in order to
reduce algorithmic noise.
6.2.2 Attack and results
The attack aims to recover the coeﬃcients of the private key f one by one.
In order to conduct the attack, the power consumption of the register which
is used during the multiplication and accumulation of the partial products, is
analysed. The dissipated power is expected to be correlated with the Hamming
distance of the register between its new and previous values. Thus, the power
consumption predictions Hi of the circuit are calculated with the function Hi =
H(newi⊕ previousi) for the ith cipher text. Here, a problem occurs if the relevant
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coeﬃcient of f is zero. The situation fi = 0 results in no change in the value of
the register which makes the Hamming distance zero. Since the register value
does not vary in this case, DPA can not be applied successfully. Hence, for the
power model only key guesses -1 and 1 are tested. If none of them leads to
a high correlation coeﬃcient, then that key coeﬃcient is assumed to be 0. This
hypothesis can be conﬁrmed or rejected when attacking the next coeﬃcient, since
the new value of the register depends on the all previous values which involve the
key coeﬃcients.
The coeﬃcient fN−1 is used in the ﬁrst partial product which is e0i fN−1. Thus,
to recover that coeﬃcient, the clock cycle which the result of the product is
loaded to the register, must be analysed. Since, for a new computation, the
register starts with the value zero, the Hamming distance of the register becomes
Hi = H(e0i fN−1⊕ 0) = H(e0i fN−1). Similarly for the second coeﬃcient fN−2, the
Hamming distance is computed with the equation Hi = H(e0i fN−1 + e1i fN−2⊕
e0i fN−1).
Figure 6.6 shows the attack results for fN−1 and Figure 6.7 shows the results
for fN−2. In the ﬁgures it is clearly seen that the correct hypothesis fN−1 =−1,
fN−2 = 1 leads to the highest correlation coeﬃcient. The result is also conﬁrmed
by ﬁnding the correlation coeﬃcient for the pair ( fN−1, fN−2) together, instead
of conducting the attack coeﬃcient by coeﬃcient. The result is shown in Figure
6.8. The remaining coeﬃcients can be obtained with the same method.
Figure 6.6: Correlation traces for fN−1
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Figure 6.7: Correlation traces for fN−2
Figure 6.8: Correlation traces for the pair ( fN−1, fN−2)
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6.3 DPA Countermeasures for Public-Key Cryptosystems
DPA attacks give the opportunity of inferring the secret keys easily in contrast
with the classical cryptoanalysis methods. In order to prevent DPA, many
techniques have been proposed by the researchers. The main aim of these methods
is to randomize the input data or the sequence of the calculations to diminish the
correlation between the power consumption of the circuit and the known data
which is assumed to be open to the adversary.
RSA [13] is one of the most popular public-key cryptosystems but carelessly
done implementations of RSA is not immune to DPA. In RSA, encryption
and decryption are performed by modular exponentiation. If m is assumed as
the plaintext message and e as the public-key, then the encryption of RSA is
performed as follows:
c= me (mod n) (6.2)
Decryption is performed with the modular exponentiation of ciphertext c with
the secret-key d:
m= cd (mod n) (6.3)
The parameter n = pq where p and q are prime numbers. The keys satisfy
the equation d = e−1 (modφ(n)) where φ(n) = (p−1)(q−1) is the Euler totient
function.
RSA implementations can be made DPA resistant in two ways. The ﬁrst method
is two randomize the input data and/or the secret exponent d [39]. The classical
method is to use dˆ = d + rφ(n) during modular exponentiation where r is a
random number. Calculation of cdˆ (mod n) gives the correct plaintext since
xφ(n) = 1 (mod n). With this method, the power trace of the circuit during a
decryption is not correlated with d anymore, but correlated with dˆ which is
updated for every decryption.
The other method is to randomize the algorithm used for calculation of the
exponentiation. Walter proposed an algorithm called MIST to randomize the
exponentiation which is a modiﬁed version of the binary square and multiply
algorithm [40]. The MIST algorithm generates randomly diﬀerent addition
chains to perform a speciﬁc modular exponentiation. Furthermore, this algorithm
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disables the attacks which are based on recognising the repeated use of the same
pre-computed multipliers during an individual exponentiation. Another exponent
randomization algorithm is presented by Chevallier-Mames [41] which mentions
the concept of self-randomized exponentiation. In the algorithm the exponent d is
used itself as the source of randomness. During the exponentiation the exponent
d is randomly splitted to smaller parts. The exponentiation is performed with
these splitted parts instead of the secret exponent d. The method is not only
applicable for RSA groups but also applicable for elliptic curve groups.
Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) [14] is another commonly used public-key
cryptosytem. However the straightforward implementations of ECC are also not
resistant to DPA attacks. An elliptic curve is the set of points (x,y) that are the
solutions of the equation below which is deﬁned over a ﬁeld K:
y2+a1xy+a3y= x3+a2x2+a4x+a6 (6.4)
Elliptic Curve Cryptography is based on the scalar multiplication of an elliptic
curve point P with a scalar d. The scalar multiplication dP can be computed
simply by adding the point P with itself d times:
dP= P+P+P+ · · ·+P︸ ︷︷ ︸
d-times
(6.5)
Addition formulas of diﬀerent curve points (P1 +P2) and the same curve points
(P1 +P1) diﬀers from each other. Detailed information about the elliptic curves
can be found in [42].
The DPA attacks on elliptic curves are focused on ﬁnding the scalar d which is
the secret key of the system. In order to prevent these attacks three methods are
proposed in [43]. The ﬁrst method is to randomize the scalar d. It is proposed
to multiply the point P with d′ = d+k#ε instead of d. #ε represents the number
of points on the curve and k is a scalar. The multiplication satisﬁes the equality
Q = d′P = dP since #εP = O where O is the identity element of the group. The
second method is to blind the point P. It is done by adding a random point R to
P for which we know S = dR. Scalar multiplication is performed by computing
d(R+P) and then subtracting S= dR to obtain Q= dP.
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It is also possible to calculate Q= dP by using the projective coordinates [42] of
the point P. The projective coordinates P(X ,Y,Z) of a point P(x,y) can be given
as:
x=
X
Z
y=
Y
Z
(6.6)
The last method is to use randomized projective coordinates. The projective
coordinates of a point is not unique since (X ,Y,Z) = (λX ,λY,λZ) for λ 6= 0.
Thus, by using a diﬀerent, randomly chosen λ for each scalar multiplication,
randomization of the point P can be achieved.
Another approach in strengthening the ECC implementations is to randomize the
scalar multiplication algorithm. Oswald et. al. proposed a countermeasure in [44]
which uses randomized addition-subtraction chains in the scalar multiplication
algorithm. They present two algorithms which uses diﬀerent addition-subtraction
chains to calculate the scalar multiplication. Then, they randomize their
algorithms by inserting a random decision. A random variable is chosen during
the computation and according to the value of that variable the classical binary
algorithm or one of their proposed algorithms is used to proceed the computation.
6.4 Power Analysis of DPA Resistant NTRU
In this thesis a DPA resistant NTRU implementation which is intellectual
property of ESAT/COSIC Katholieke Universiteit Leuven, is also analyzed.
The implementation under test was using input randomization to resist DPA.
The circuit under test was implemented on a Xilinx VirtexE (xcv1000e-7hq240)
FPGA. The clock frequency of the circuit was 2 MHz. 10000 points were sampled
with a current probe for each power trace. Sampling is done with an oscilloscope
with 1 GHz bandwidth at a 2 GS/s sampling rate.
The methodology in Section 6.2.2 is also applied here. In the power analysis
N = 16,384 traces were used. One trace contains nine clock cycles. At every
(k× 1000)th point a rising edge occurs. Fig. 6.9 shows one power trace for the
protected NTRU implementation.
For this attack correlations are calculated diﬀerently. Firstly, nine intervals which
include nine rising edges of the clock was chosen. Then the diﬀerence of the
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Figure 6.9: One power trace for the protected NTRU implementation
maximum and the minimum value in the interval is calculated to ﬁnd the current
change during the rising edge of the clock. Hence, nine points are obtained for
each trace. First point belongs to the start point of the decryption, second point
belongs to the loading of the partial sum e0i fN−1 and the third point belongs to
the loading of the partial sum e0i fN−1+ e1i fN−2. Finally, correlation coeﬃcients
are computed between these points and the hamming distance model.
The computed correlation coeﬃcients are plotted versus the number of traces.
Figure 6.10 shows the result for the coeﬃcient fN−1. It is seen that the key guess
fN−1 =−1 shows a higher correlation curve after 8200 traces. The result for the
second coeﬃcient fN−2 is shown in Figure 6.11. It is obvious that only after 100
traces, the key guess fN−2 = 1 has the higher correlation coeﬃcient.
Figure 6.10: Correlation coefficients for fN−1
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Figure 6.11: Correlation coefficients for fN−2
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7. CONCLUSION
In this dissertation, compact and low power NTRU implementations that are
suitable for pervasive security applications such as RFID and WSN systems are
presented. One design is capable of only performing NTRU encryption and the
other one can perform both encryption and decryption. Encryption-only NTRU
design consumes only 2.8 kgates, which makes it a very compact solution for
resource restricted devices. The encryption takes 56.44 ms at 500 kHz which
is 3.5 % faster than the best previous work. As a result of the low leakage
technology library, static power consumption is considerably low and the design
consumes 1.72 µW of dynamic power during one encryption operation. This
presents a saving of a factor more than 2, when compared with the previous
work. This work is also the ﬁrst one to present a complete NTRU design with
encryption/decryption circuitry. Encryption-decryption NTRU has a gate count
of 10.5 kgates. The optimized design has the following results, 5.93 µW , 6.04
µW and 0.45 µW for dynamic power consumption during encryption, decryption
and idle state, respectively. The latency for encryption and decryption, is
56.78 ms and 119.23 ms at 500 kHz respectively. Moreover, the security of the
implementation against side channel analysis attacks has been explored and it has
been shown that the implementation is not immune to Diﬀerential Power Analysis
(DPA) attacks. The secret key was revealed by using 16,384 power measurements,
but we expect that less measurements suﬃce. A protected implementation of
the NTRU design which is intellectual property of ESAT/COSIC Katholieke
Universiteit Leuven, is also tested for side channel resistance. The keys of the
protected implementation were inferred with the same attack too.
As the future work of this thesis, there are opportunities to improve both the
performance and the security of the designs. It is possible to speed up the
designs by adding more Polynomial Multiplier (PM) units with a small change
at the rest of the circuit. This will enable the designs to compute more than one
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ciphertext coeﬃcients in parallel at a time which will reduce the encryption and
decryption latency. It is also possible to perform decryption with one polynomial
multiplication if the design parameters (N,q, p) are selected in another way which
also brings the necessity of redesigning some modules. Finally, to improve the
security of the designs, eﬀective countermeasures against DPA attacks must be
explored and implemented.
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